Introduction
[The] perpetual consumption and reproduction of capital affords the explanation of what has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or carries away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabitants are ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as it was before.
-John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy. Book I, Chapter V, paragraph I.5.19.
Hurricane Katrina might have given even John Stuart Mill reason to doubt whether Gulf
Coast communities would recover from the devastation that followed in her path.
Indeed, at the present writing (three and a half years after the storm), some communities appear as though they might stand as shocking exceptions to Mill's optimistic thesis. 1 And yet, in some communities, Mill's expectations of swift recovery have indeed been born out. The community surrounding the Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) Catholic Church in New Orleans East, for instance, is widely considered to be a post-Katrina success story.
With the exception of the French Quarter, Garden District, and Uptown (which incurred little to no flood damage due to higher elevations), the MQVN neighborhood was amongst the hardest hit communities in New Orleans post-Katrina. Still, it came back faster and more robustly than virtually all other neighborhoods in Orleans Parish, even those with similar levels of flood damage, and those that were considerably more affluent. According to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), the principal consulting group advising the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, ‚The New Orleans East area experienced some of the city's most severe flooding, with flood depths ranging from five to more than twelve feet,‛ (ULI 2006: 43) . Early recommendations in the redevelopment planning process, in fact, suggested that its proximity to the Bayou Sauvage National Further, within a year of the storm, 70 of the 75 Vietnamese-owned businesses in the MQVN neighborhood were up and running. Sixteen months after the storm, on the other hand, only ten percent of the residents living in the affluent Lakeview neighborhood had returned; a threshold that the MQVN community had achieved within weeks of the storm (Bohrer 2007) .
Much of the attention in the disaster research literature has focused on why certain communities are so vulnerable to disasters and on the barriers that stand in the way of recovery in these communities. Erikson (1994) , Klinenberg (2003) , Peacock et al. (1997) and Wisner et al. (2004) , for instance, have discussed how institutional disregard for the poor and the elderly as well as structural racism has made some individuals and areas particularly vulnerable to disasters ranging from flooding and fires to heat wave associated deaths. Focusing on Katrina, Colten (2006) , Dyson (2006) , powell [sic] et al. (2006) have argued that the long history of racial segregation in public housing in New
Orleans and private real estate markets that concentrated poor black communities in low-lying areas like the Lower Ninth Ward explains why members of this demographic group were amongst the hardest hit. Similarly, BondGraham (2007) argues that city planners intentionally make it harder for poor residents to return so as to externalize the costs of providing services for the poor to other municipalities and states. And, Bosman et al. (2007: 21) have argued that redevelopment planning initiatives continue a historical pattern in which ‚African-Americans have been pushed out of their homes, or forced off the land they once occupied.‛ There is a consensus emerging in this literature that the communities that are most likely to successfully weather and recover from disasters are those that are economically and politically advantaged prior to the disaster. 3 The MQVN community, however, was not particularly wealthy nor did it posses a great deal of political clout prior to Katrina. 4 Its success thus presents something of a puzzle. How did this community engineer such a rapid recovery? How did it recover more quickly than communities that suffered less damage, were wealthier and/or were politically more powerful?
A full response to this question would include an examination of the wide array of social resources embedded within this Vietnamese-American community. As we argue elsewhere, for instance, many members of the community overcame considerable hardship when they emigrated from Vietnam to New Orleans and could draw on this collective narrative as they faced the challenge of recovering from Katrina (ChamleeWright and Storr 2008) . In this article, we focus on the critical role played by the MQVN Catholic church in the redevelopment effort. Specifically, the MQVN church provided a unique bundle of club goods that fostered social cooperation and community rebound in the wake of disaster. Utilizing this bundle of club goods, residents in the New Orleans East Vietnamese-American community a) rebuilt their distinct ethnic-religious-language community, b) overcame the social coordination difficulties created by Katrina, and c) engaged in successful political action to protect their community. Neither the theory of clubs literature nor the disaster recovery literature draws this critical link between club goods and community redevelopment; none stress the role that club goods play in helping communities overcome the collective action challenges associated with postdisaster community recovery. This paper also hopes to complement an already welldeveloped theory of clubs literature by highlighting more generally the role that club goods can play in rendering individual agency in adverse conditions more effective.
A brief history of MQVN community
The MQVN community was founded by refugees from three North Vietnamese Orleans East, a poor (and by then) predominantly African-American community.
The later waves of Vietnamese migration to this area were a spontaneous outgrowth of this initial settlement. Drawn by ties to friends and family, another 2,000
Vietnamese arrived in 1976 alone, and migration continued through the 1980s (Bankston & Zhou 2000) .
By 1980, many Vietnamese had moved out of the Versailles Village Apartments and into single family homes located or built within the same neighborhood.
Though the community as a whole was still relatively poor, wealth continued to accumulate in the neighborhood with higher-end housing developing alongside more modest bungalows (ibid. Vietnamese shopping centers in the community, the establishment of an urban gardening project, and the building of a housing development for the elderly adjacent to the church. The lay leadership within the church was also wellorganized and robust, with key community members taking responsibility for organizing specific block grids within the neighborhood. The community remained socially and politically insular, however, with leaders preferring to attend to the issues within rather than beyond the community.
The MQVN church was (and remains) the hub around which spiritual, social, and commercial life evolved. Father Vien estimates that ‚of the 4,000 people within a onemile radius of the church pre-Katrina, at least 3,800 of them are Catholic.‛ 7 Located at the physical center of the neighborhood, the church is within walking distance for most members of the community. players returning to rebuild would be the socially optimal outcome, since by assumption α > β > δ and 2α > 2β > δ + β. See Figure 1 for a representation of this game in extensive form.
Given that both players have imperfect information about what the other player is likely to do, the strategy that dominates will depend on whether the expected value of returning is greater or less than the payoff from remaining in the new locale. Assuming that the expected value of remaining in the new locale is greater than the expected value returning under conditions of persistent uncertainty, then remaining in the new locale will be the dominant strategy. That is, assuming that β > α p r + δ(1 -p r), where p r is the probability that the other player will return, not returning will be the dominant strategy.
Since 2α > 2β, the strategy of remaining displaced is socially suboptimal. This poses a serious challenge for displaced residents. In order to obtain the socially optimal outcome the families would have to locate one another and then credibly commit to returning. Finding where your neighbors were relocated after a disaster and obtaining credible commitments from them that they will return is extremely costly if not impossible. This is true in the two player game depicted in Figure 1 . This challenge is even more severe the larger the number of families in the community displaced by the disaster and the further widespread the evacuation destinations.
Religious organizations and other community based clubs, however, can provide a bundle of club goods in the form of an organizational structure for coordinating the activities of members, information about other displaced members of the community and appropriate forms of support that both allows members to coordinate their return and lowers the costs of returning and rebuilding.
This new game is depicted in Figure 2 
Figure 2. Return game with the aid of the church uncertainty about the other player's intentions. In other words, the religious organization can increase the probability that the other player will also return (i.e. p r increases), which would raise the expected value of returning. If the church is extremely effective it can create a scenario where the expected value of returning trumps the expected payoff from not returning (i.e. β < α p r + δ(1 -p r)). The religious organization also assists returning residents by providing charitable aid θ, so that returning residents receive their original payoff (α or δ) plus θ. Community return and rebuilding, thus, depends on whether the players are convinced by the religious organization that the return of their neighbors is likely and whether the religious organization provides the necessary aid. If either δ + θ > β or the religious organizations involvement is sufficient to convince either player that community rebound is likely (i.e., that p r is sufficiently high so that β < α p r + δ(1 -p r)), then return will be the dominant strategy. By providing ethnically and linguistically appropriate aid to displaced members of the community that might not have otherwise been available to them and a bundle of other club goods including an organization structure that could be used to facilitate collective action, the MQVN Catholic Church fostered the rebound of the New Orleans East VietnameseAmerican community after Hurricane Katrina.
That club goods can be key for community redevelopment after a disaster and the role they play in rendering individual agency more effective is not discussed in the theory of clubs literature. Instead, the focus in that literature has been on how clubs of varying sizes, organizational structures and membership demographics overcome collective action problems relying of various monitoring strategies and incentive systems in order to provide quasi-public goods. 13 Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965) are widely recognized as seminal works in the theory of clubs. Buchanan's (1965) insight was that many valuable goods and services are neither purely private goods nor are they purely public goods. Recall from Samuelson (1954) that purely public goods are non-rivalrous (i.e. person A can consume it without preventing an unlimited number of others from simultaneously consuming it)
as well as non-excludable (i.e. it is not possible to prevent people who have not paid from consuming it). Purely private goods, on the other hand, are both rivalrous (i.e. if person A consumes it person B cannot also consume it) and excludable (i.e. person A can be made to pay for consuming the good). Buchanan recognized that few goods meet the strict criteria of a purely public good along the lines that Samuelson (1954) suggests and that a number of the goods traditionally thought of as public goods can be provided by clubs (i.e. exclusion is possible). In fact, Buchanan points out that common experience suggests that people often prefer club goods (e.g., membership at a community swimming pool) over purely private goods (e.g., a swimming pool in the backyard).
Similarly, Olson (1965: 36-43) recognized that organizations exist to further the common interests of their members through the joint provision of collective goods. He distinguished between inclusive groups, which jointly produce non-rivalrous collective goods and so do not need to restrict membership, and exclusive groups, which must restrict membership since they produce impure public goods that would suffer from overcrowding. Olson (ibid.: 35) , however, observed that as groups grew larger they tended to provide less optimal levels of the collective good. And, he noted that group size and the level of coordination and organization needed are positively correlated when the provision of a collective good requires members to act simultaneously (ibid.:
43-52).
Buchanan' s theory of clubs and Olson's theory of collective action have much in common and both have been extended in a number of ways (Cornes and Sandler 1996) .
Recently, Dasgupta & Kanbur (2007) , for instance, have argued that ‚ideologies of community solidarity‛ in ethnic and religious communities which provide exclusive goods can actually ‛trump‛ the incentives that the poorest in those communities have to support redistributive policies (see also Dasgupta & Kanbur 2005a and 2005b) . Others have applied this theoretical lens to examine the provision of club goods by religious organizations and communities. Kuran (2001) , for instance, describes how Middle Eastern Islamic waqfs provided water services, light houses, hospitals, orphanages, and public spaces as a means of acquiring a credible commitment from the state to enforce property rights and not predate against immobile private assets. In their study of the economic organization of the medieval church, Ekelund, et al. (1996) note that in addition to providing many private goods, the Church also provided essential public goods, such as a system of law and courts, and exerted its ‚transnational influence to limited armed conflict among petty warlords who dominated the political landscape of western Europe‛ (ibid.: 25). Further, the Church supplied club goods such as formal education and institutions that aided the poor (ibid.).
Additionally, Iannaccone (1992; argues that many apparently non-rational acts committed by the religious faithful are rendered reasonable and intelligible once it is understood what role club goods can play in mediating the relationship between religious groups and their members. By providing club goods, religious groups can more effectively call upon members to make sacrifices, such as prohibitions on the use of alcohol and other worldly pleasures. In turn, such prohibitions serve as an efficient way to limit access to the club goods offered within the church. He further argues that strict religious groups are actually stronger than less strict groups and can increase the value of the goods they offer because strictness (e.g. clothing and dietary restrictions) reduces free riding allowing groups to differentiate between members whose participation is likely to be marginal and those who are likely to be committed. Berman (2000 Berman ( , 2003 has likewise argued that the religious provision of club goods can also explain destructive behavior among radical militia groups. Members who engage in violent acts cut off outside options, increasing their ability to credibly commit their loyalty to the group. This, in turn, limits access to those devoted to the cause.
Although there is now a quite extensive theory of clubs literature and even several studies which apply this theoretical lens to examine the provision of club goods by religious organizations, few studies have used this framework to study ethnic churches as inclusive, multi-product, multi-generational clubs which provide highly specific ethnic services. 14 Similarly, no studies have looked at how the church provision of club goods can foster social cooperation and community rebound in the wake of a disaster.
The logic presented here suggests important new territory in which club goods theory can lend insight to the social coordination problems post-disaster contexts present. In Section 4 we examine how this logic is born out by qualitative empirical analysis of the MQVN community. When the first residents returned to New Orleans East just a few weeks after the storm, the circumstances were anything but hospitable. There was no access to clean water, no electrical service, none of the area businesses were open, the contents of the homes and businesses had been festering for weeks, and the mold was advancing by the day. The extreme conditions of post-Katrina New Orleans in these early weeks might
The provision of club goods in the MQVN
give reason to doubt arguments that emphasize the rationality of the faithful (Iannaccone 1992 (Iannaccone , 1994 Kuran 2001; Berman 2000 Berman , 2003 . The willingness to take on the disproportionate costs of an early return might instead be viewed as non-rational deference to the authority vested in the parish priest. And a selective reading of the interview transcripts might support this view. Reflections like those offered by Chinh Do †16 are common:
Chinh Do † : Father Vien, he's why we're staying. He put this community back together. He's a powerful man, too. The way he sounds, it's like he knows. We believe in him and we trust him too. What he says, we do it.
And yet, the interview transcripts also demonstrate that far more is going on here than an uncritical deference to church authority.
Specially, MQVN was an inclusive, multi-product, multi-generational club which provided a bundle of highly specific culturally and linguistically appropriate club goods that fostered return. These goods included (i) Vietnamese language religious services,
(ii) Vietnamese language training, (iii) occasional weekend markets for selling Vietnamese produce, arts and crafts, (iv) a space where members of the community could socialize (v) meeting spaces for religious and non-religious Vietnamese groups, (vi) an organizational structure that facilitated social coordination, (vii) community leadership that served as a focal point for community action and (viii) ethnically appropriate charitable aid. Additionally, several Vietnamese-American business owners belong to the church and provide members of the neighborhood with ethnicallysensitive goods and services (e.g. Vietnamese grocery stores, Vietnamese-language medical, legal and financial services, etc.). Again using these club goods, residents in the New Orleans East Vietnamese-American community a) rebuilt their distinct ethnicreligious-language community, b) overcame the social coordination difficulties created by Katrina, and c) engaged in successful political action to protect their community.
a. Rebuilding the ethnic-religious-language community
From the beginning, MQVN has taken on a distinctly cultural, as well as religious mission. The former pastor Father Francis Bui, for instance, has said that ‚We have the Vietnamese church to preserve Vietnamese culture and to pass on the language. If it wasn't for that, we could just assimilate into other churches for religion‛ (Bankston & Zhou 2000: 460) . Specifically, the MQVN church has provided its members a bundle of club goods including Vietnamese language religious services, Vietnamese language training and occasional weekend markets for selling Vietnamese produce, arts and crafts that allowed members to create a highly specific ethnic-religious-language community prior to Katrina. This community radiates beyond the physical structure of the church to the neighborhood blocks of homes and businesses that surround it. After the storm, this bundle of goods proved critical to attracting displaced residents back to New
Orleans and to their rebuilding the community. Or, in terms of the logic presented in Section 3, the MQVN church provided ethnically and linguistically appropriate aid (i.e. it contributed to θ) which significantly increased the magnitude of the payoffs associated with returning whether or not others return. 17 The existence of a rich network of ethnic-religious ties within the MQVN community was well-documented long before Katrina. In particular, Bankston & Zhou (1995 , 2000 and Zhou & Bankston (1994 , 1998 emphasize the role the bundle of club goods provided by MQVN played in the integration of Vietnamese-American youth into the community and their academic achievement (see also Caplan et al. 1989 Caplan et al. , 1992 Rumbaut & Ima 1998) . Among other benefits, the regular religious services in
Vietnamese, Vietnamese language instruction and the networks of support provided through the church, results in the neighborhood youth having a sense of ‚Vietnamese-ness‛ that enabled them to avoid the temptations and pitfalls that many poor minority children frequently face. In particular, ‚frequent church attendance leads to greater 'Vietnameseness,' and greater 'Vietnameseness,' by making young people subject to the network of supports and constraints of the Vietnamese community, leads to behavior conducive to upward mobility‛ (Bankston & Zhou 1996: 31) . 18 The elderly, in particular, appear to place a premium on the distinct offerings of the MQVN Catholic Church.
Danh Tran † : [I]n this community, old people tend to be more religious. They want to go to church everyday. In other places, there are churches too, but they are far away, and these people don't have any means of transportation to get there. Their children can only take them to church once or twice a week. They cannot take the elders there often.
Daily church attendance is normative among retired members of the communitysomething most elders can achieve on their own by taking the short drive or by walking.
After Katrina, MQVN lobbied to have a FEMA trailer site for its elderly residents established directly opposite the church. This made the daily commute for religious services shorter still.
But MQVN did not just provide its members club goods that gave them the opportunity to build a distinctly Vietnamese Catholic spiritual life. It also provided them with club goods that allowed them to build a distinctly Vietnamese social life that made a rather ordinary neighborhood a special environment.
Hoa Duang † : Before Katrina, we Vietnamese people met each other everyday.
We go to church. On weekends, we go to church in the morning and in the evening, we get together and dine. We spend the whole day together.
When we asked people who they generally spend time with and how they know them, almost all of the respondents reported that outside of family, their primary social relationships are with other members of the church community.
In addition to networks of friendship that radiate out from the MQVN hub, the Elderly members of the community were among those who found adjustment to life in other cities particularly difficult. Additionally, they did not find churches or other organizations in these cities that provided the ethnic club goods that are necessary to (re)create the sort of ethnic-religious-language community that exists in the MQVN community. By extension, younger family members also benefit from the social connectivity the MQVN community affords their elderly parents and grandparents.
Expectations of support are extremely high within the Vietnamese-American family even under normal circumstance (Haines et al. 1981; Kibria 1994 
b. Overcoming the social coordination difficulties created by Katrina
The church is basically the center, it's the heart of the community<Anything you want to do, you have to go through the church.
-Thao Vu † In addition to providing club goods critical to the establishment (and redevelopment) of an ethnic religious community, the church also provides club goods in the form of meeting spaces for religious and non-religious Vietnamese groups and an organizational structure that facilitates the social coordination necessary to align the interests and activities of religious and secular life. This was certainly the case before Katrina. Priestly authority in both church and neighborhood matters, the structure of pastoral care, and overlapping networks of religious and secular activities were characteristic of life in this community pre-Katrina (Bankston & Zhou 2000) , and combined fortuitously to facilitate a swift en masse return post-Katrina. when you're in front of him, you can't say no to him… Whatever he says, you say, ‚Yes Father. We'll get it done.‛ As important as this ‚authority effect‛ is, however, the ‚signaling effect‛ is an essential complement in the effort to coordinate a mass return (Chamlee-Wright 2008) . 21 Or in terms of the logic presented in Section 3, the organizational structure of the MQVN church increased the probability that many if not all displaced residents would return, raising the expected value of return for any displaced resident. By holding services so early on and making judicious use of media attention, Father Vien was able to signal that the New Orleans East community was not suffering from the collective action problem facing many other communities.
Mathew Nguyen † : After that Mass… we all *went+ home and we started to contact each other from Houston, and all over the place. So it all got solved.
Priestly authority seems to have played a double role. Deference to Father Vien's calls for rebuilding directly impacted people's decisions. In turn, because people were confident that others would heed the pastor's call to return, they felt more assured that they would not be the only ones to return. This community was able to achieve the socially optimal outcome (i.e. community redevelopment) because MQVN's organization structure and Father Vien's priestly authority (conveyed through this structure) facilitated displaced families locating one another and convincingly committing to return. Or in other words, the church provided club goods that effectively converted the game depicted in Figure 1 to the game depicted in Figure 2 . MQVN was thus vital in helping displaced community members overcome the collective action problem that they faced after Katrina.
It is important to point out, however, that rebuilding is moving ahead, not just because of priestly authority. Priestly authority is rather a complementary force that enhances a more dispersed system of social action, much of which lies beyond the dayto-day oversight of the priest. The physical and social infrastructures provided by the MQVN church all but erase the social distance between religious and secular civic life, and the social coordinating capacity we expect to find within the church generously spills over into non-religious civic life.
Before Katrina, lay leadership within the MQVN Catholic Church, primarily in the form of the Pastoral Council, played an important role in fundraising, celebrations, and church policies (Zhou & Bankston 1994) . Further, the neighborhood grid system of pastoral care ensured a high degree of overlap between church and neighborhood concerns. After the storm, this system provided a ready-made social infrastructure through which they were able to organize a mass return. Though Father Vien's authority was essential in organizing a mass return of the community, such an attempt would have been impossible if not for the coordination capacity of the lay leadership at each evacuation site and the organizational structure that connected these lay leaders to Father Vien, to one another and to their charges.
Father Vien could not be in six cities at once, nor could he possibly manage the detailed plans that were unfolding on the ground.
Upon their return, for example, it was again the lay leadership within the community who provided relief supplies for the earliest returnees. This was critical because government and non-profit emergency relief organizations were not adequately providing culturally and linguistically appropriate aid after the storm. 22
Interviewer: Where were you getting food that first weekend [you returned]?
Fr. Luke Nguyen: I went with a-how do you call-a pillar. I call him a pillar of the church….*T+wo men, Mr.
[X] and the other man is Mr. [Y] . They belong to a group called Lingning pangtom. Lingning pangtom is the adult group, the *elders+ of the parish… They belong so that anything needed in the parish, they go to do it. They are the pillars of the church… These two men here, plus the head of the council, Mr.
[Z]. They are the pioneers who come back and rebuild, and they are the one that helped the community and so they're the answer.
Without them, I don't know how we can call our people back because we can think, we can utilize, we can strategize together with them but they are the workers. They pursue what the goals are.
In short, the relationship between priestly authority and lay leadership is reciprocal, each requiring the other to be effective. Church leaders were able to organize and mobilize a widely scattered population by working through the Pastoral Council and less formal sources of lay leadership. In turn, the lay leadership was able to persuade people to respond because they had the moral force of the church behind them.
Additionally, relying on the organizational structure of the church, parishioners were able to receive linguistically and ethnically appropriate aid which lowered the cost of return making it more likely.
The coordinating capacity of the church is expanded further by the high degree of overlap between leadership within the church and formal secular civic activities. PreKatrina, the church facilities served as the community center, providing space for after- The overlap is not just a matter of post-Katrina convenience but the extension of a pre-Katrina pattern of strategically deploying social capital resources within the religious community toward secular ends. In describing the overlapping membership between the Vietnamese Educational Association (VEA) and the church, Bankston & Zhou (2000: 460-461 ) quote one of the VEA directors as saying, ‚we formed the Education Association among the people of the church, at first. We wanted a way to carry on Vietnamese culture and we wanted to help our young people do well in American schools. We knew that we could only accomplish these things by working together.‛
In the months following the storm, the church was the physical site at which people could find their immediate necessities, including clothes, blankets, water, food, and cleaning products, no matter whether those supplies had been secured through the church or one of the non-profit organizations working out of the church. Further, by housing such a wide variety of social service organizations, the church helped to create an informal bridge between residents and their insurance companies and government relief agencies such as FEMA, SBA, and The Road Home Program. As a way to make ends meet, several of the people working in the nonprofit organizations housed at MQVN worked with government relief programs in the early months after the storm.
This experience proved to be an important source of local knowledge that helped residents navigate the thick bureaucratic maze of insurance companies and government assistance. Given the difficulties even native English-speakers reported having in navigating these processes, the existence of this informal bridge was the only way many non-English speakers in this community were able to cope with the process at all.
In sum, the club goods provided by MQVN made social coordination possible prior to Katrina and fostered the quick return of this community after the disaster. that would have the power to initiate eminent domain proceedings in areas deemed unviable. It was also in these reports that the ULI recommended that large portions of New Orleans East might be considered for conversion to ‚open space.‛ In other words, the early days of the redevelopment planning process threatened to introduce greater uncertainty into the decision of displaced residents to return, increasing the likelihood that the sub-optimal outcome depicted in Figure 1 would obtain.
c. Political action to protect their community
MQVN leaders and parishioners perceived the ULI recommendations as a direct threat to their ability to rebuild their community. The return of residents was viewed as a crucial first step in resisting this threat, but church and neighborhood leaders assumed that repaired homes would only go so far in dissuading city officials from razing the neighborhood if that was their intention. Community leaders bet that the early repair of the church and resumption of services would serve as powerful political tools in the effort to reclaim their community.
Father Luke: First, my priority was to bring the people back. And how we're going to do that? By way of fixing the church. The church is the center. The church is the anchor. The church is the center stage of communication. The church is where people find comfort, news and everything, updated news from the city. Because during that time, there was mixed messages from the city.
[Were] they going to bulldoze this? …What if we come back, we build, and they bulldoze it? What's the benefit of it? … And so we decided to fix the church and set the church as the center stage of meetings, of uniting the people and so we fix up the church. …And when we came back and rebuild, pulling our people in, people increased [from] two hundred, five hundred, eight hundred, a thousand, they won't force us out. So right now their plan is gone.
Their plan is gone and they can't do anything about us. Other places, if they don't come back they going to bulldoze. But not this place.
In response to perceived threats from the city administration, the church pastors became increasingly savvy in their use of the various media to exert their own form of pressure. By photographing the assembled parishioners attending Mass and granting requests for interviews from any news organization that would tell their story, the church leadership was able to use the political symbolism of a repaired church filled with peaceful parishioners in their efforts to restrain the city administration.
Another tactic the church used to resist political pressure from the city was to bypass their authority and deal directly with service providers. After appealing to the city to restore electrical power with no success, Father Vien contacted the local power company Entergy directly. The Entergy representative explained that only half of the power stations were functioning and that most of that capacity had been directed to downtown and midtown for reconstruction. Yet, he also told Father
Vien that the backbone connecting the power stations to New Orleans East was operational. The next day, Senators Clinton and Landrieu were going to see the Mayor…
Only then were we able to come in.
Though the church had secured electrical service and a FEMA trailer site, and the rate of return was high relative to other neighborhoods, the community still faced another major hurdle. Faced with massive waste removal issues, the city administration resurrected plans to locate a landfill in an environmentally vulnerable area adjacent to the MQVN community. According to an agreement between Waste Management and the City of New Orleans, twenty-two percent of the revenues from the landfill would go directly to the city if the site was located within the city limits. 25 The placement of the landfill would scuttle the church's plans for a senior housing complex and Viet-Town.
Though the community had seen impressive rebound in terms of returning residents, the MQVN leadership saw the city's landfill initiative as a threat to the community's long-term viability. Thus all the resources that had been going into the community planning process pre-Katrina were now diverted to the landfill issue.
The primary goal of the church and civic leadership was to mobilize the community to demonstrate against the landfill, but the language barrier and a history of political insularity promised to stand in the way. At the same time, there was growing concern that the neighborhood youth were at significant risk, given the desperate state of the public schools and a dearth of organized youth activities since the storm. The proposed solution to both problems was the creation of VAYLA (Vietnamese-American Youth Leadership Association). By deploying the bilingual skills and more ‚Americanized‛ taste for political activism among teenagers and young adults, VAYLA played a central role in coordinating demonstration efforts, connecting with local and national environmental and community rights organizations, and eventually defeating the landfill initiative. One adult organizer remarked that their success in defeating the landfill offered a paradigm for how they should proceed with their other community development efforts.
After Katrina, the need for the church to serve as a catalyst for political resistance became clearer. Given the opposition the city administration had to rebuilding in the area, residents would have had little chance acting in isolation. The MQVN leadership provided the capacity to organize and resist political pressure to abandon the community.
Conclusions
The analysis presented here addresses the particular question of how it is that this neighborhood, even in the absence of abundant financial resources, rebounded more robustly than other communities facing similar conditions. By providing a bundle of club goods that allowed the members in this community to create what amounts to a ‚second homeland‛ and the coordination capacity to withstand a physically and politically inhospitable environment, the MQVN church has facilitated a level of social cooperation that has been difficult for many other communities to achieve.
In particular, because the MQVN church provides club goods which allow parishioners to create an ethnic-religious-language community, its members who would otherwise be disconnected and marginalized in the dominant culture can instead lead productive and connected lives; or in other words, they can exercise their agency more effectively. Because the church provides an organizational structure that facilitates complex social coordination, an individual's decision to return to a post-disaster context is less likely to be an isolated choice; or again, the agency the individual deploys under such circumstances is rendered more effective. Because that structure also facilitates political action, the individual's resistance to political threats is combined with the resistance of others; and once again, his or her agency is again rendered more effective.
Beyond the specific question of how this community executed such a successful recovery, this case contributes more generally to our understanding of what role club goods can play in connecting individual agency to overall patterns of social coordination. The existing literature demonstrates that the religious provision of club goods can help explain the evolution of social institutions (Kuran 2001; Ekelund et al. 1996) and can render intelligible behavior that might otherwise defy explanation (Iannaccone 1992 (Iannaccone , 1994 Berman 2000 Berman , 2003 . This study adds to that literature by highlighting how the church provision of club goods renders individual agency more effective in achieving social outcomes.
In addition to contributing to the literature on the provision of club goods by religious organizations, this analysis also complements the literature examining the role social capital plays in post-disaster contexts (Beggs et al. 1996a (Beggs et al. , 1996b Hulbert et al. 2001) . While much of the existing literature focuses on how individuals deploy their social networks to meet the immediate challenges of a natural disaster, this analysis fills an important gap by examining the role socially embedded resources (in this case club goods) can play in long term recovery of an entire community. In doing so, this study makes a contribution to the burgeoning literature exploring issues of agency and structure in the post-Katrina recovery process (Colten 2006; Elliott & Pais 2006; Henkel et al. 2006; Hartman & Squires 2006; Herring 2006) . 4 In 2008, however, Anh "Joseph" Cao, who has close ties to this community, was elected to represent Louisiana's 2nd congressional district which contains almost all of the city of New Orleans.
5 It is worth noting that the effort to build the church was driven from the ground up. As Bankston & Zhou (2000: 460) observe, ‚…this church was not established from above by a clerical hierarchy, but it came into existence as a consequence of the desires and efforts of lay participants.‛ This detail is significant in that it demonstrates that this community has had a history of achievement when it comes to community development. 7 According to the 1990 Census, this community was 87% Catholic (Bankston & Zhou 2000) . 8 The other Vietnamese Catholic churches in the area provided a higher proportion of English language services to Vietnamese language services, for example. 9 This observation is also made in Zhou & Bankston (1994) .
10 See Chamlee-Wright (2007 , 2008 for a review of how regime uncertainty can distort the return calculus of displaced residents. 11 We assume that players would want to return if they could recreate the community that they had before the disaster. If this were not true in at least some cases then disasters which displaced residents would always result in depopulation.
12 Of course there are costs to both decisions and so payoffs should be thought of as net payoffs.
13 See Cornes and Sandler (1996) for an excellent overview.
14 See Congleton (2005) for a notable exception. 15 The research team deployed both purposive sampling and random sampling within the MQNV neighborhood, the FEMA trailer site adjacent to the church, and specific demographic groups to ensure a representative diversity in income, age, gender, and language competency within the sample. The advance team setting up the interviews determined whether a Vietnamese interpreter would be required. Once a round of interviews was completed, the audio files were translated and transcribed. After the English language portions of the audio files were transcribed, another interpreter translated and transcribed the original Vietnamese language on the audio files to ensure accuracy. The transcripts were then coded for themes and patterns, including those discussed here.
16 Whenever possible, we protect the identity of the interview subject. Names with the ‚ †‛ superscript are pseudonyms. Because of the nature of their commentary and their profile within the community, it would be impossible to obscure the identity of the pastors of the MQVN church. In such cases, we obtained permission to use the subject's real name. 17 Alone, that payoff may or may not have been sufficient to make returning the dominant strategy (i.e. δ + θ > β). In the case of the MQVN community, however, the church also provided club goods which lowered the uncertainty surrounding the intentions of others to return. This will be explicitly discussed in subsequent sections.
18 Iannaccone (1994) argues that a religious group can avoid free riding by increasing strictness, but also points out that too much strictness (say, strictly limiting social interaction with people outside the religious group) can be inefficient if it severely restricts economic opportunity. Research on the deployment of social capital in the New Orleans East Vietnamese community, such as Zhou & Bankston (1994) , suggest that strictness in this case (holding youth close to the Vietnamese community) cuts off social opportunities within the poor minority community but expands economic opportunity in the dominant affluent culture. Thus, in this particular context, strictness and economic opportunity are not at odds.
19 Some members of the local business community were able to articulate the importance their business had for the overall redevelopment process. For example, Nhu Pham † : Before I came back, I was thinking that we were just going to open up the business no matter what. Because the people only come back if there are businesses providing supplies and other basic services. If there were none, the people wouldn't dare come back. I open up the business just to keep this place alive, I only want to make sure that we don't have any net loss. The main purpose is to keep the community alive.
20 Though most people cited personal qualities Father Vien possessed as important in his ability to lead, many also said that it was the position, not the man, that mattered mostand that they would have abided by the wishes of any priest, not just Father Vien. 21 Virtually every member of the MQVNN community we interviewed reported that the local church leadership was important to the community's rebuilding success. Almost every interview makes reference to the authority vested within the priesthood and/or the personal leadership qualities of the parish priests. In addition to the authority effect, approximately one-third of the interview subjects described a distinct signaling role church leadership played in attracting people back. 22 The MQVN Community Development Corporation was established following Katrina to address this concern. See http://www.mqvncdc.org/ for information of this organization.
23 One of the directors at the CDC reports that familiarizing the community with the functions of her office has been a bit of a challenge. Members of the community more often than not assumed that she worked for the church. In response, she would say ‚'I don't work for the church,' and then having explained what the CDC is and all that stuff, they *would say+, 'okay, so you're with the church?' and I'm like, 'Yeah, I'm with the church.'‛ 
